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Abstract: The State’s construction of Italian identity during the Diaspora informs 
the way the Italian population perceives non-Italians as incompatible with certain 
elements of Italian culture, specifically Catholicism, Whiteness, and ties to the land. The 
discourse of the Lega Nord has tried to capitalize on recent immigration to advance their 
own agenda by using the media to promote specific aspects of this Italian identity. Lega 
Nord discourse, broadcast by the media, was able to influence the parameters of the 
immigration debate. This was achieved by the media constructing images of migrants as 
“others within” the Italian nation through differentiating them based on certain fixed and 
exclusive elements of identity emphasized in the LN’s rhetoric. By stressing certain 
elements of identity, the LN has created a political discourse that is hostile to migrants, 
which serves their political agenda in achieving homogeneity and reinforces their stance 
on Northern autonomy. However, Identity is not inherently fixed or exclusive but the 
Lega Nord has emphasized the elements of Italianità that seem absolute in order to 
construct migrants as others within. Since identity is not absolute, Italian identity and can 
be reimagined to emphasize components that create a more inclusive discourse.  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
  In this paper I examine the intersection between Italian identity, the national print 
media and television, and specific political actors and parties and their role regarding the 
perception of migrants within Italy. I argue that the State’s participation in the 
construction of Italian identity post-Unification in 1875, and throughout the Italian 
diaspora until the 1920s, has informed the way the Italian population perceives non-
Italians as incompatible with elements of Italian culture. Five elements of Italianità, or 
Italian identity, arose from the nation building after the diaspora: language, family, 
Catholicism, Whiteness, and ties to the land. All of these components have had an 
important role in shaping Italian identity, but the right-wing regionalist party the Lega 
Nord later politicized two, which were Catholicism and ties to the land. Whiteness was 
not an explicit identity component constructed by the State during the Diaspora, but was 
a tacit assumption later emphasized by the Lega Nord. 
I demonstrate how Italian discourse employs symbols to construct images of 
migrants and refugees as invaders and “others within” the Italian nation by differentiating 
migrants based on these fixed and exclusive elements. Lega Nord discourse uses these 
perceptions of incompatibilities to influence policy that serves their agenda of achieving a 
homogenous and autonomous Northern Italy. The promotion of this discourse was 
achieved through the political alliance formed between the Lega Nord and Former Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s party Forza Italia, which owns and has controlled sizeable 
portions of the Italian media and has enabled the Lega Nord to broadcast their discourse 
and reach a larger audience. I argue that if Italian identity continues to be largely 
portrayed as being defined by these elements, specific groups of migrants can never be 
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considered “compatible” or completely belong within Italian mainstream society. If the 
Italians people are interested in changing this discourse, a more inclusive conception of 
Italian identity will need to be imagined. 
This paper considers the construction and deconstruction of Italian identity 
through Benedicts Anderson’s theoretical lens of the creation of the nation through 
communication channels, which offers a way of altering perceptions and attitudes toward 
immigrants in Italy. This paper is divided into three sections: Italian Identity, Migrants 
and the Media, and a Conclusion, which includes suggested further research. In Section 
1, I answer the question “what is Italian identity?” through tracing its development in 
Italy beginning with the period of Italian Unification. I focus on five key elements of this 
identity that I see as constituting membership in the Italian community. This section 
serves as a foundation for Section 2 that then allows me to analyze the role of Italian 
identity in informing the Italian discursive portrayal of migrants in the twenty-first 
century and how migrants’ statuses are ascribed within the nation. In Section 2, I also 
analyze specific political actors and parties that use notions of Italian identity to incite 
fear and negative attitudes towards migrants by portraying them as incompatible with 
these components of Italian identity. Due to the exclusive and fixed nature of these 
elements of Italian identity, I argue that specific migrant groups will continue to be 
perceived as incompatible if the media and public discourse continue to describe them as 
being a threat to this identity. The final section of this paper offers suggestions for further 
research.  
I would like to emphasize a few limitations of this paper. My conception of Italian 
identity paints with a broad brush and does not reflect all of the regional and localized 
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conceptions of Italian identity. Generalizing identity in this way allows me to understand 
which fears or insecurities the Lega Nord have appealed to regarding Italian identity to in 
order to convince Italians to embrace their discourse. For the purpose of this paper I draw 
on crucial historical moments that have played a key role in the perception of what 
constitutes the general “Italianità”, as well as the major facets of this Italianità that 
reappear throughout history and at regional levels. I also acknowledge that due to the 
nature of my paper, I will not be conducting an extremely detailed analysis of attitudes 
towards migrants in Italy. I do suggest a more detailed analysis in Section 3 as a logical 
extension of the work I have begun in this paper. 
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2.0 ITALIAN IDENTITY 
 In this section, I wish to answer the question, “What is Italian identity?” which I 
consider through understanding its development. I trace its formation primarily post 
Unification in 1875, specifically focusing on how a particular conception of Italian 
identity was encouraged to promote nation building and consolidation in the wake of 
unification and in the context of a potentially destabilizing diaspora. In the case of the 
Italian Diaspora, the State attempted to actively protect Italian culture abroad by building 
an Italian identity among its emigrants.1 This nation building also shaped identity at home 
as well, as policy that targeted emigrants was created to unify the Italian people via tying 
them back to the land. In addition to this, many Italians who emigrated either eventually 
returned home or had family remain in Italy. The historical overview will be confined 
primarily to the time frame of the beginning of Italian unification in 1861 through the end 
of the Diaspora in 1916, and continuing up until the deceleration of emigration by 1975.  
This section serves as a foundation by defining Italianità, or the characteristics of 
Italian identity. For the purposes of my paper, the key elements of this identity that 
emerged from the nation building process are language, family, Catholicism, Whiteness, 
and ties to the land. All of these components have an important role in shaping Italianità, 
but only four were a part of the State’s nation building agenda, which were language, 
family, Catholicism, and ties to the land. Whiteness was not an explicit identity 
component constructed by the State, but was a tacit assumption and was later emphasized 
by the Lega Nord. These elements determine who or what is compatible within Italian 
                                                        
1 Choate, Mark I.  "Italy at Home and Abroad After 150 Years: The Legacy of Emigration and the 
Future of Italianità." Pg. 53. 
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society and therefore impacts how migrants will be received. I begin by considering the 
general development of the nation and nationality following Benedict Anderson’s theory 
of the nation as an imagined community. I reconstruct Italy’s history through the lens of 
Anderson’s model of how the nation develops. Two historical events I focus on are 
Italian Unification and the Diaspora, as I see these events as having the greatest impact 
on the formation of Italianità.  
2.1 Historical Overview 
Historically, the territory that now makes up the state of Italy was once composed 
of a number of city-states that were self-governing and politically independent. After the 
end of the Roman Empire, the cities and villages that emerged throughout the peninsula 
“retained a significant degree of identity, particularly because its cities sustained their 
character as civic and economic centers, even when they became more self-sufficient, 
built defensive walls, and lost their international commercial connections.”2 Urban 
nobility arose and established power in separate cities, intermarrying with the other 
leading families to maintain power. Some of these cities disappeared throughout the 
medieval era but their commercial character endured, and many were also administrative 
centers for the ruling powers of the Church.3 
The rise of communes and city-states in Italy throughout the fifth and sixth 
centuries were influenced by the Roman tradition of municipal government and the early 
cultural and political division of the country under different spheres of influence; the 
                                                        
2 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pg. 45. 
3 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pg. 46-47. 
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Byzantine, the Lombard, and later the Franks.4 At this time the Church began to organize 
as a hierarchical structure throughout the peninsula, distinguishing the bishop of Rome as 
the Pope.5 Additionally, throughout the Middle Ages, the Church played an important 
role in Italian culture via theology, sculpture, and architecture. By the eleventh century, 
the central authorities of these spheres of influence had disappeared in Italy and were 
replaced by bishops. At the end of the eleventh and beginning of the twelfth century, the 
cities faced complex trading problems that were solved with the institution of the city-
state to establish trade relations with similar merchant communities. Struggles for power 
between the local church and nobility during this time also lead to the emergence of the 
popolo6 “as a real political force,” which many historians understand as the 
reintroduction of representative government.7 By the end of the twelfth century, there 
were around three hundred fully functioning independent city-states throughout Italy.8  
2.1.1 The Italian Renaissance and the Enlightenment 
In Italy, the standard Italian grammar today taught in schools is based on the 
Tuscan language, which derived from Latin and began as a regional spoken language 
with various dialects. The classical Latin language was the written language of scholarly 
works in the country and beyond since the time of the Roman Empire while the Tuscan 
language only began to appear in poetic texts around the thirteenth century, later entering 
                                                        
4 Epstein, S.R. The Rise and Decline of Italian City States. London: London School of 
Economics, 1999. Pgs. 1-17 
5 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pg. 47. 
6 “Popolo” means “the people” in Italian. The popolo arose as a group to protect the interests of 
the commoners against the nobility in the communes at the time. 
7 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pg. 60. 
8 Epstein, S.R. The Rise and Decline of Italian City States. London: London School of 
Economics, 1999. Pgs. 1-17 
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the courts of the peninsula. Up until the thirteenth century, Italian scholars wrote 
exclusively in Latin despite the existence of many Italian languages and dialects since the 
eighth century.9 From roughly the Middle Ages to the beginning of the Renaissance, the 
revered Latin language and literature were taught throughout Italian schools and played a 
crucial role in the creation of and the participation in Italian-Renaissance culture, which 
was primarily the ‘culture’ of the elite minority.10 As the emergence of Latin literature 
and curriculum still maintained a grip within the Italian educational system.11 
A large portion of the population at this time was not literate, thus maintaining 
Latin as the language of the elite nobility. The masses spoke one of a variety of distinct 
regional dialects. More importantly, Latin was spoken throughout Europe, meaning no 
one nation could truly lay claim to it as being a uniquely distinct aspect of their culture 
and identity. The Renaissance, or the span of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, was 
the period that Italians began to write in a single literary language modeled after famous 
Italian poets such as Dante Alighieri, who produced many writings in the Florentine 
dialect, which contributed to the Tuscan language’s popularity.12 Later fourteenth century 
poets, such as the humanist Francesco Petrarca and fellow poet and friend Giovanni 
Boccaccio, also broke free from writing in Latin by producing sonnets written in the 
Tuscan vernacular, which catered to a specific educated and elite masculine audience.  
                                                        
9 Najemy, John M. Short Oxford History of Italy: Italy in the Age of the Renaissance 1300-1550. 
Oxford, GB: OUP Oxford, 2004. ProQuest ebrary. Pg. 19. 
10  Black, Robert. Humanism and Education in Medieval and Renaissance Italy: Tradition and 
Innovation in Latin Schools from the Twelfth to the Fifteenth Century. Cambridge: New York; 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. Introduction: Pgs. 1-22.  
11 Black, Robert. Humanism and Education in Medieval and Renaissance Italy: Tradition and 
Innovation in Latin Schools from the Twelfth to the Fifteenth Century. Pgs. 225-236 
12 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pgs. 63-64.  
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By the fourteenth century, the Tuscan language was promoted as the standard 
language of the peninsula due to the concentration of social and economic influence 
throughout the Tuscan region, predominately in Florence. The introduction of the 
printing press in the late fifteenth century further solidified this standardization through 
distribution of literature. Within a few decades of its introduction in the West, books were 
mass-produced throughout Europe. These productions of texts in the vernacular increased 
as the printing press could now produce for the market of non-Latin readers, thus opening 
up lines of communication between speakers. While Latin was not distinct to the territory 
that would become Italy, the Italian vernacular was, and could have “true political 
analogue” unlike Latin’s religious authority.13  
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the period also known as the 
Enlightenment, that there was a renewal of Italian culture regarding the revitalization of 
civil and political fields.14 Poets and writers producing their works in the Tuscan 
vernacular were able to reach an even wider audience and women writers and poets, such 
as Gaspara Stampara, began participating in the creation of literature more inclusive of 
women. With the decline of the “sacred” Latin language and the rise of the Tuscan 
vernacular, ideas of group membership began to open up to include a wider Italian public. 
By the time Italy began unification in 1861, “Italian” existed as the primary literary 
language of the nation.15 However, to this day there co-exist various regional languages 
                                                        
13 Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. Pg. 41 
14 Moravia, Sergio, Breidenbach Flora, and Moravia Sergio. "An Outline of the Italian 
Enlightenment." Comparative Literature Studies 6.4 (1969): 380-409. Web. 
15 The Accademia della Crusca (1583-present day) is an Italian society for scholars and linguists 
who published dictionaries and assembled vocabularies deemed to be “Italian” (or more 
specifically, Florentine, which initially sparked some controversy) in the 1900s due to anxieties 
over comparisons with English and French dictionaries. They sought to distinguish the Italian 
language as having a noteworthy literary tradition through a collection of words (Vocabolario 
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and dialects throughout the country, which contributes to language separation as a barrier 
to achieving a fully homogenous culture and identity in a strict sense.16 
Language was not the only facet of Italian identity taking root at this time, as 
Catholicism also played a role regarding the creation of national identity. Since the 
seventh and eighth centuries, Italian schools were characterized by predominantly 
Christian education and consisted of the study of religious texts written in Latin was the 
primary education, and later in the ninth century monastic schools were established 
which also incorporated Latin literature.17 The Papal States were territories throughout 
the Italian Peninsula that had existed since the 8th century and were under the direct 
control of the Pope, who held enough power and influence in Italy that he was often able 
to defy the will of the Byzantine emperor during his rule.18 While the Middle Ages were 
a time of faith for the Italian people, the Renaissance experienced a time of secularism 
and decline of Church power. “Renaissance popes became obsessed with creating a 
temporal state in central Italy that drew them even deeper into secular politics, thereby 
diminishing their spiritual credibility.”19 The papal seat was moved to Avignon in 1309 
and was not returned to Rome until 1377. The political influence of the Church declined 
                                                        
degli Accademici della Crusca). The Vocabolario “represented, for centuries, in a politically and 
linguistically divided Italy, the most precious collection of the common language, the strongest 
internal bond of the Italian community, and an indispensable tool for all those who wanted to 
write in good Italian.” (As stated by the Academia on their site www.accademiadellacrusca.it) 
16 Many of these dialects are perceived as demarcating the ‘lower-class’ or are aligned with the 
Lega Nord, and therefore racism (I will discuss this further in Section 2).  
17 Black, Robert. Humanism and Education in Medieval and Renaissance Italy: Tradition and 
Innovation in Latin Schools from the Twelfth to the Fifteenth Century Pg. 176-178. 
18 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pgs 15-43.  
19 Najemy, John M. Short Oxford History of Italy: Italy in the Age of the Renaissance 1300-1550. 
Oxford, GB: OUP Oxford, 2004. ProQuest ebrary. Pgs. 59-60. 
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during this time from its former feudal prestige and received a lot of criticism for 
previously having had too much wealth and power.20  
However, parishes in the countryside still had great cultural influence because 
they were important social centers. “Churches were preferred sites for social display, 
youthful flirtation, and business agreements,” unlike in urban cities at the time, which 
was attributed to the fact that priests worked in the fields alongside their parishioners 
while priests in the cities were distinguished by their wealth and education.21 Although 
the absence of the papacy from Rome in the fourteenth century severely hurt Church 
power in Italy, it did not completely remove its cultural presence from the territory. The 
Church regained some influence during the fifteenth century when Latin religious texts 
such as Psalms, Gospels, and stories of Saints were being translated into regional 
vernaculars because complete editions of the Bible in Italian or Latin were very 
expensive and could not be afforded by most parish clergy at the time.22 These texts 
circulated more widely and reached a larger audience once they were they were more 
affordable and written in the regional vernaculars. In addition, the Church maintained 
cultural influence throughout the Renaissance due to the development of religious 
brotherhoods, which provided fellowship and a sense of community through hosting 
religious festivals, performing acts of charity, and encouraging civic participation.23  
                                                        
20 Najemy, John M. Short Oxford History of Italy: Italy in the Age of the Renaissance 1300-1550. 
Oxford, GB: OUP Oxford, 2004. ProQuest ebrary. Pgs. 59-60. 
21 Najemy, John M. Short Oxford History of Italy: Italy in the Age of the Renaissance 1300-1550. 
Oxford, GB: OUP Oxford, 2004. ProQuest ebrary. Pg. 63. 
22 Najemy, John M. Short Oxford History of Italy: Italy in the Age of the Renaissance 1300-1550. 
Oxford, GB: OUP Oxford, 2004. ProQuest ebrary. Pg. 66. 
23 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pg. 68-69. 
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The Church solidified its place in Italy’s Renaissance culture by sponsoring 
painters, sculptors, and architects to construct Cathedrals, paint murals depicting biblical 
stories, and carve statues of saints to name a few examples.24 “A major reason that Italian 
cities of the Renaissance developed a unique place in history was the abundant patronage 
of art provided by the Church, private organizations, and prominent individuals.”25 Many 
scholars attribute much of Italy’s Renaissance identity to the Church and its contributions 
to Italian culture during this time. However, in the sixteenth century the Catholic Church 
began to decline in power once again during the European Reformation and it responded 
with severe repression in the form of censorship and hunting for suspected heretics. In the 
century following the Renaissance, there were attempts to limit Church power and 
promote the development of agriculture by encouraging the sale of the lands, which were 
in a state of commercial and agricultural backwardness due to the influence of the Papal 
States and nobility who owned the land.26  
2.1.2 Napoleonic Italy and the Risorgimento 
The period of the Risorgimento (“resurgence”) was the nationalist movement 
towards Italian Unification into a single Kingdom of Italy beginning in the early 
nineteenth century. By the time of the Risorgimento, Italian Romanticism27 had begun to 
distinguish itself with the political involvement and struggle for Italian independence. 
                                                        
24 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pg. 75-77. 
25 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pg. 79. 
26 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pg. 89-90. 
27 Romanticism was the literary, musical, and intellectual movement that began in Europe and 
was associated with liberalism and nationalism.  
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These ideological and literary movements helped to “arouse national consciousness” and 
resulted in a series of political events that produced territorial and political unification. 
The movement for independence from foreign powers also combined with Catholic 
doctrine during this time. For example, writers such as Alessandro Manzoni produced 
patriotic literary works that favored Christian subject matter and Roman Catholic 
doctrine. During this time, poems, historical writings, and political works were concerned 
with the struggle for Italian independence, such as those written by Giuseppe Mazzini.28 
The sentiments of the Italian Diaspora, which was beginning to occur at this time, were 
reflected in the writings produced during the Risorgimento period. 
Philosopher and Tuscan statesman Niccolò Machiavelli had once yearned for a 
political leader who could unite Italy in his treatise the Prince.29 The Risorgimento was 
the era of Romanticism and the nation-state and Machiavelli’s treatise, which opposed 
foreign domination and promoted a unified Italy, was of particular interest to those 
seeking Italian independence.30 The idea of a leader rising up and uniting Italy inspired a 
sense of national identity, however ideas of what Italy would look like after Unification 
created division amongst the people.31 Leading up to Unification, French military and 
political leader Napoleon Bonaparte had been able to secure large portions of the Italian 
                                                        
28 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pg. 110-111. 
29 Described in Choate, Mark I.  "Italy at Home and Abroad After 150 Years: The Legacy of 
Emigration and the Future of Italianità." Pg. 52. To clarify, Machiavelli lived before this time, 
from 1469-1527. However, his treatise was of particular interest during the era of the nation-state. 
Likewise, renowned Italian poet Dante Alighieri also yearned for a leader who could unite the 
Italian territories after having them divided among so many foreign powers. In Dante’s Divina 
Commedia, he compares Italy to a horse with an empty saddle.  
30 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pg. 83 
31 There was debate as to whether Italy should become a monarchy or republic post-unification. 
Many of the revolutionary leaders, such as Giuseppe Mazzini, wanted an independent republic.   
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peninsula during the French Revolutionary Wars, and in 1805 he was crowned king of 
Italy with the Iron Crown of Lombardy. During this time, Napoleon supported the idea of 
unification for strategically motivated reasons. When Napoleon was defeated in 1815 and 
the Congress of Vienna was convened to redraw the European continent, Italy was 
returned to a patchwork of independent governments ruled by various European powers, 
predominantly Austria, prompting the Risorgimento.32 Italian nationalist Giuseppe 
Garibaldi led the nationalist unification movement with the backing of France, despite 
strong repression by Austria.33 The movement was successful with the Second War for 
Independence from 1859 to 1861, which ended with peace negotiations after the Austrian 
forces were defeated in the war’s two costly battles.34  
The nationalist Risorgimento movement was finalized with the fall of Rome to the 
Italian government and the completion of the unification process by 1871, which had 
been ongoing since 1861.35 However, the final result left the country politically divided 
and economically weak after extensive fighting. During this period, the capital shifted 
three times, beginning in Turin and then moving to Florence in 1865 before finally being 
established in Rome by 1871.36 There was ongoing struggle throughout the Risorgimento 
regarding the pope’s power and the Church’s place within the nationalist movement.37 By 
                                                        
32 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web.  
33 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pg. 110-117. 
34 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pg. 114-115.. 
35 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pg. 119. 
36 Choate, Mark I.  "Italy at Home and Abroad After 150 Years: The Legacy of Emigration and 
the Future of Italianità." Pg. 57 
37 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web.  
 22 
the time of Italian Unification the pope had lost control of the Papal States. Upon Rome’s 
selection as the nation’s capital, Pope Pius IX issued the Non Expedit decree, which 
prohibited Catholics from participating in Italian national politics and put immediate stain 
on the newly formed Italian government.38  
Although the Church no longer controlled territory throughout the peninsula like 
it once had, its cultural and political influence was still strong. The Catholics obeyed the 
prohibition and refused to participate in national politics in accordance with the pope’s 
decree. In response, the government issued the Law of Papal Guarantees in 1871 in order 
to separate church and state, guarantee protection of the Church, and ensure the pope with 
privileges comparable to those of the head of state.39 However, the Pope remained 
distrustful of the government and refused to accept their offer, so the prohibition 
continued. Despite this response, the Law of Papal Guarantees was not revoked although 
the issue between the Pope and the King of Italy was not officially resolved until 1929.40 
In the wake of Unification, the newly formed Italian state not only had to worry about 
poverty and lack of economic development, but also trying to please the formidable 
Church. It was during this period that various political groups had begun to rise up with 
different visions for the future of Italy and modest Italian emigration had begun to 
accelerate into a full-scale diaspora.  
                                                        
38 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pg. 119. 
39 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pgs. 119-120. 
40 Killinger, Charles L. History of Italy. Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2002. ProQuest ebrary. 
Web. Pgs. 118-119. 
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2.1.3 Implications of Italy’s Unification: the Diaspora 
The Risorgimento nationalist movements and the unification process set the 
groundwork for a unified Italian identity, but social upheaval and political change 
prevented a homogenous identity from realization.41 Largely, the country remained 
deeply divided post-Unification, but why was Unification not able to solidify a collective 
identity and unified state? The post-Unification period witnessed many Italians leaving 
the country due to a culmination of pre-existing issues and the availability of new 
economic opportunities elsewhere. Push factors included poverty, poor agricultural land 
management, technological innovations that were lagging in Italy but available abroad, 
and competition with grain prices. Pull factors included labor demand in North and South 
America that provided new economic opportunities, which were paired with open 
immigration policies and cheaper, more reliable steam transportation.42  
Before Unification, Italy was composed of a variety of principalities that were 
controlled through proxy by various European powers until the nineteenth century. The 
system of city-states functioning in Italy that lasted throughout the Renaissance began to 
deteriorate with the rise of the modern nation-state during the early nineteenth century. 
Italy has been a country of mass emigration since Italian Unification in 1861 and 
continuing up until the 1930s.43 In the first decade of Unification, Italian politicians were 
mainly preoccupied with the establishment of an Italian nation rather than focusing on 
foreign policy or the global processes taking place. The country had previously 
                                                        
41 Choate, Mark I.  "Italy at Home and Abroad After 150 Years: The Legacy of Emigration and 
the Future of Italianità." Introduction. 
42 Gabaccia, Donna R., and Fraser M. Ottanelli. Italian Workers of the World: Labor Migration 
and the Formation of Multiethnic States. 
43 Choate, Mark I.  "Italy at Home and Abroad After 150 Years: The Legacy of Emigration and 
the Future of Italianità."  
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experienced emigrations in moderate numbers due to predominantly Southern Italians 
leaving in search of work elsewhere since the peninsula had been in political fragments 
and mismanaged for centuries.44 However, this emigration was primarily limited within 
Europe. In contrast, the formation of the nation-state coincided with a large scale Italian 
Diaspora that lasted well into the 1930s. Like the asymmetrical economic benefits of 
Unification, the Diaspora did not affect all regions of Italy equally. 
Unification had broken down the feudal land system and the national economy 
briefly improved, but generations of poor land management via subdividing plots of land 
had left most of the farming inefficient and unable to support the population. In addition, 
imposed grain taxes (“macinato”) also hurt the Southern farmers since agriculture was 
the leading production of the South.45 At the time, poverty was worsening and the South 
began to rebel against the taxes levied by the government and the lack of land reform, 
which had been promised to Southern peasants during the struggle for Unification.46 
Internal discord in the South led the newly created Italian government to impose a 
military solution. This solution involved suspending civil liberties and seizing control in 
the South, which in turn contributed to the creation of the organized band of criminals 
known as the mafia.47 The government’s repressive response to internal discord did not 
sit well with the Southern Italians who felt that they had been targeted by the government 
post-Unification because of the implementation of the grain taxes and the failure to 
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provide promised subsidies for economic development of the South. “Against the rhetoric 
of ‘Unification’ contained in official accounts of the history of Italian nation-making, the 
‘real’ history of the Italian South is one of colonisation, and ‘the construction of 
Southerners as an ‘‘inferior and immodifiable race’’ served greatly to justify the military 
intervention that insured the unification of the peninsula against southern resistance in the 
mid-to late 1800s’ (Verdicchio 1997: 191-4, quoting Ganduscio 1970).”48 The social, 
political, and economic crisis occurring throughout the South instilled an image of the 
South as a dangerous place, in addition to its historical association with poverty.49   
Economic divisions between the more wealthy and industrious North and the 
poorer rural South became more pronounced and the country specifically experienced the 
largest immigration from laborers and farmers leaving from the South. Initially from 
1876 to 1900, emigrations were from the northern and southern regions but then from 
1900 to 1920, the majority of emigrants were leaving from the South.50 Southern Italy 
suffered the largest loss of laborers due to poverty driving the workers to search for work 
abroad. Antiquated farming tools compiled with the mismanagement of the land had 
resulted in insufficient farming and a physically demanding and unsustainable way of 
life, which fueled the disproportionate Italian emigration.51 The increase in poverty, 
lagging technological development, and agricultural issues all simultaneously occurred 
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while economic opportunity elsewhere became available.52 At the same time, North and 
South America were beginning to industrialize and had a high labor demand tht they tried 
to fill. Countries such as Argentina and the United States encouraged immigration 
through open immigration policies by promoting the myth of land for everyone.53 Thus, 
young Italians began leaving the country in search of work and improved livelihoods.  
Emigration on such a large and disproportionate scale during this period from 
Unification to WWI created yet another division within the country between two distinct 
groups: those who questioned the loyalties of Italian emigrants abroad and those who 
advocated for cultivating Italian communities abroad that could assimilate while still 
maintaining a common standard Italian language and a unified ethnic identity.54 Historian 
Elizabeth Venditto writes, “After Italian Unification, few citizens of the nation spoke 
standard Italian, shared liberal ideas of nationalism, or felt vested in the new state.”55 
Italian Unification was a geographical unification of the territory; it did not create a 
unified national identity. Unification was followed by a mass emigration of Italians to 
Catholic or Protestant states, most notably to Argentina, Brazil, and the United States.56 
The Italian people remaining in the territory entered the twentieth century under a unified 
state that was suffering from a bad economy and accelerating emigration. 
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Between 1880 and 1915, around thirteen million Italians left Italy and emigrated 
to the Americas.57 By 1985, this number had increased to a total estimated around 26 
million reported Italians who had emigrated to other countries. This emigration resulted 
in what many theorize as the development of a diaspora national identity. “Late 
nineteenth century migrants often learned to think of themselves as Italians not in Italy 
but abroad.”58 The two Italies’59 unification indirectly created a unified Italian national 
identity through the emigration that followed as the government tried to construct a 
national identity so that Italian immigrants would potentially return or would maintain 
and pass down their language and traditions in their new countries.60 Furthermore, 
Italians who remained in Italy began to work to consolidate Italian influence abroad by 
encouraging separate Italian communities to form abroad in order to foster what they 
viewed as their identity and culture.61 Passing down traditions and cultural markers were 
one effect of emigration that assisted in the creation of a national identity, which was 
encouraged by the State and the Catholic Church, as I will later discuss. 
Such a large percentage of Italians working and residing outside of the country 
concerned the State by threatening loyalties with potential new identities.62 In the case of 
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late nineteenth century and early twentieth century Italian emigration, the State had to 
find a way to maintain power and control while its workforce disappeared abroad. 
Traditions, language, and cultural heritage were not enough to secure loyalty and 
economic returns to the Italian state. In other words, more measurable and visible 
assurances needed to be secured.63 On one hand the State needed the physical presence of 
soldiers and on the other it needed economic stimulation via remittances if Italy was to 
remain a unified nation and keep up with nineteenth and twentieth century 
industrialization.  
The extent to which this nationalism could be fostered also depended on the 
response of the receiving countries, which also had their own nationalistic agendas in 
mind. By the twentieth century, almost half of Buenos Aires’s population was foreign 
born with Italian immigrants compromising almost a third of this population.64 However, 
Buenos Aires is not often evoked in historical or political writing as being as ethnically 
diverse as often as cities such as New York are, which claimed a foreign born population 
far smaller than that of Buenos Aires in the late nineteenth to twentieth centuries. Despite 
the diversity of immigrants in Buenos Aires, the Argentine state largely treated the 
population as homogenous rather than as multiethnic by using rhetoric that created a 
sense of unity and identity, of being Argentine, or more specifically a porteño65. Many of 
the immigrants arriving in Argentina in the early to mid nineteenth century were coming 
during the civil wars that were accompanying the formation of the Argentine nation and 
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thus were there during the state’s consolidation, giving them a sense of solidarity and 
new Argentine identity.66 Argentine society largely viewed immigrants not as others but 
as homogenous amongst themselves,67 which was not the case for Italians being received 
in New York or elsewhere in the United States. Accordingly Italian nationalistic 
sentiments did not develop uniformly abroad and measures taken by the State affected 
emigrants differently.  
While political and economic ties via assured citizenship and remittances created 
material connections back to Italy, ideological apparatuses were also employed through 
religious education and missionary resources.68 Although religion has been integral to the 
development of many nations, it has simultaneously been at odds with the State’s 
formation and continuation.69 Within the context of Italy, the same Catholicism used by 
the Papal States to maintain power over the people and later used by the Vatican to 
combat Unification was an essential nation-building tool in the period that followed that 
could be used and controlled by the State. Religious identity has played an essential role 
in the formation of Italian national identity, which has been historically grounded in 
Catholicism.  The explicit expression of this link to national identity can be traced back 
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as far as 1891, when Catholic Bishop Giovanni Battista Scalabrini gave a speech about 
Italian identity and Catholicism at an Italian conference on emigration in the city of 
Genoa.70 “However, Scalabrini’s call stood out because of his insistence that “the 
sentiment of nationality” was linked to Italians’ Catholic faith and its loss was a threat to 
Italian’s continued Catholicism.” 71  
Later in 1899, one of Scalabrini’s close friends and fellow supporter of the 
continued Catholic education of Italian emigrants, Bishop Geremia Bonomelli, echoed 
Scalabrini’s plea by saying “language and Religion are two of the principal means for 
keeping alive and solid the ties between mother Italy and her daughter Italy, which grows 
and prospers in the South American Continent.”72 While Scalabrini and Bonomelli had 
the intention of encouraging Catholic Italian migrants to practice their faith abroad 
throughout the time of the Italian Diaspora, these claims can also be analyzed as a part of 
a larger state mission to cultivate Italian national identity: the state was able to “rely upon 
culture and religion to brand emigrants as Italian.”73 Italian missionaries played an 
integral role in shaping this Catholic identity abroad via collaborating with the Italian 
State to send missionaries to communities of Italian emigrants and promoting the Italian 
language as the official language and means of keeping their Catholic faith strong.74  
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The promotion of the Standard Italian language was also employed as a means of 
differentiating Italians abroad from their compatriots of their new countries whilst also 
unifying the Italians at home who spoke a variety of regional languages and dialects. In 
addition, Italian clergy and bishops founded organizations within these communities that 
were specifically for addressing the spiritual and material needs of the Italian emigrants. 
Venditto writes, “italianità was not incompatible or separate from Catholicism, but 
closely intertwined with it, and thus by strengthening italianità and a sense of Italian 
community abroad, they [the Italian priests and clergy] thought that they would also be 
reinforcing Catholicism.”75 Not only did the Church assist Italian emigrants after they 
permanently settled abroad, but it also set up organizations to assist Italians in planning 
their departure from Italy by helping with travel and employment information throughout 
the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.76 The Catholic missionaries at the time 
were directly involved in Italian nation-building projects alongside the State in order to 
tie the emigrants closer to the Church.77 
Kinship was also important in establishing cultural ties and connections through 
the Catholic Church. While kinship has been important in the development of most 
European countries, familism follows a slightly different pathway in Italy due to a greater 
distrust in the government and its institutions.78 Italy’s family structure has persisted as 
Mediterranean despite Northern European influence, meaning that children often live 
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with their parents well into adulthood, sometimes even after marriage.79 The Italian 
family continues to be the most important institution, or form of community, in people’s 
lives largely due to this distrust of outsiders and the State.80 Despite the rise in secularism 
and Italians’ distrust of the State, studies have found that the level of trust between 
Italians and the Catholic Church remains higher due to social networks created by the 
Church, which has created a sense of community.81 The trust in the Church might also be 
attributed to the familial nature of Church celebrations and holidays that emphasizes the 
loyalty and devotion to the family. 
2.1.4 Late Twentieth Century and European Integration 
Italy’s identity did not abruptly end with its construction during the Diaspora. 
Certain events in the late twentieth century also influenced this identity, such as European 
integration. After the Second World War, Italy voted to eradicate the monarchy and 
become a republic with the economic support of the United States via the Marshall Plan, 
which went into effect in 1948 and lasted until 1952. Immediately after the war, the 
country faced the challenges of building a new economic system in addition to a new 
political system. The industrial and agricultural sectors had broken down and there were 
housing shortages, road and railways in need of repair, and food shortages.82 In addition, 
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the breakdown of the Fascist regime left behind a “polarized political landscape of 
Communists and Catholics,” with the Communist Party emerging on top.83  
Italy in the 1950s and up until the late 1960s looked very different that what it did 
coming out of the Second World War. With the help of the United States and the Vatican, 
the Christian Democrat party was able to win the republic’s first election and establish 
itself as Italy’s ruling party entering into the 50s.84 This period of the country’s history 
saw tremendous economic and social development that propelled it into becoming a 
major industrial power and the standard of living immensely improved for the majority of 
the population. The turnaround in part occurred because of the 1950-1953 Korean War, 
which created a high demand for metal and other types of manufactured products, which 
Italy could supply. In addition, European Integration and the creation of the European 
Common Market in 1957 provided further investments in Italy and its industries. This 
period of new capital and investment and newly improved material standard of living 
contributed to a gradual decrease of Italian emigration, which had been slowing since the 
Second World War. Deceleration continued, as poverty was no longer a push factor, until 
around 1975 by which time Italian emigration had slowed significantly.  
Essential to Italy’s development during this period was the creation of the 
European Union in 1993 with the formal implementation of the Treaty of Maastricht and 
which began with six member states: West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, 
Italy and the Netherlands. It was formed as a security measure to tie neighboring 
European countries together economically and politically to prevent frequent wars from 
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continuing to occur and to secure peace. A single European currency began to replace 
Italy’s and other national currencies in 2002. By 2007, the European Union included a 
total of twenty-seven member states, and has since reached a total of twenty-eight. From 
the time of its formation, there has been a general trend of Europeanization, or the trend 
towards national institutions being supplemented or shaped by institutions/fields at the 
European level.85 While the EU is a rather recent creation, identification with Europe was 
conceived well before its official institutionalization with the gradual increase in mobility 
among States in Europe. The more Europeans have been able to travel, the greater degree 
to which a general identification with Europe has developed. Italian identification with 
Europe also determines the out-groups, or those considered “strangers” within Italy and 
other European nations. The European identity assumes Caucasian lineage, which 
implicitly links Whiteness as an element of Italian identity. Race and ethnicity are not the 
only indicator of this European identity, as non-Christian based identities also face great 
difficulty incorporating into the European mainstream culture and identity.86 The 
conception of this European identity may vary from nation to nation within Europe but it 
nonetheless informs Italian identity to some degree. While Italians considered themselves 
as European well before the creation of EU institutions, the official integration into the 
union solidified this conception of identity.  
In the late twentieth century Italy also began receiving large flows of migrants. 
Italy in the 1980s, which had begun seeing its transition into a country of net 
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immigration, was already afflicted with unemployment and deep wealth disparities 
between regions.87 By the second half of the 1980s, net immigration flows increased 
considerably. With such divisions and tensions already present, the switch to suddenly 
receiving large groups of migrants put further strain on an already struggling economy 
and people that were suffering from a lack of jobs and who had felt that their tradition 
and power were being challenged. Transitioning from a country of emigration to a 
country of net immigration during such a turbulent time presented and continues to 
present an interesting dilemma for Italy: how to rebuild social cohesion in a society that 
was once relatively homogenous but has become increasingly differentiated within the 
past twenty years.88  
2.2 Benedict Anderson’s Nation 
There are many theories regarding the formation of national identity as well as 
varying definitions of what constitutes “the nation.” According to Benedict Anderson, the 
nation itself is not an actual community; rather it is a fictional creation. In 1983, 
Anderson produced Imagined Communities and classified nationality as “an imagined 
political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” 89 where 
he outlines that national identity is imagined in the sense that most members will develop 
an imagined sense of what this community looks like without ever meeting or knowing 
most of their fellow-members. This community consists of a group of people who are 
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connected through a common idea of comradeship and fraternity. Rather than argue that 
there are “true communities” and “false nations”, Anderson argues that all types and sizes 
of communes (excluding individual interactions involving face-to-face contact) are 
imagined communities and should be classified by the ways in which they were 
imagined.90   
This shared sense of community can slowly and implicitly develop over time or it 
can be actively and politically constructed. Not only could a state construct identity, but 
the mass media could also create imagined communities through creating relationships 
between its audience and certain images or vernacular. In this way, nationalism and 
national identity do not depend on the existence of a nation-state, but depend on the 
creation of modern communication networks and individual perceptions.91. The nation is 
a fictional human creation or means of social grouping, rather than a constructed 
ideology. The implications of this model are that nations were never naturally 
manifested; rather Anderson claims that the nation is a modern conception that was 
created for political purposes, and can be intentionally called upon. 
Anderson maintains that three fundamental cultural conceptions allowed for the 
possibility of imagining the nation to develop: the development of a specific script-
language that offered privileged access to ‘ontological truth’, the belief that society was 
naturally organized around and under ‘divine monarchs’ who received access to and from 
a higher cosmological power, and finally, the conception of temporality in which 
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cosmology and history were indistinct.92 Before national culture develops, Anderson 
argues that religious culture dominated societal thought and interaction until it began to 
decline in the seventeenth century and distinctive national cultures replaced it. Printing 
press capitalism enabled this transition through allowing literature to be printed and 
easily distributed in the vernacular, making it more accessible to a larger public. Print 
capitalism opened the door to the standardization of calendars, clocks, and languages. In 
summary, nationalism was a product of modernity and the development of 
communication channels and it was created with political objectives in mind. I will now 
apply Anderson’s theory to the creation of the Italian nation. 
Anderson’s theory of the decline of script-language, or the exclusive classical 
languages such as Latin, as leading to the development of national language plays a 
particularly important role when analyzing language’s relationship with national identity. 
Developing a national language is often the driving force behind national unity, as it is an 
indicator of a collective national identity. Anderson notes that language creates a special 
kind of contemporaneous community, by which words are joined to create national 
anthems in the forms of songs and poetry. While the words alone or the particular melody 
does not hold value as it stands, the sentiments that accompany it generate a feeling of 
being connected to those who share the same identity and territory.  
During Unification, the State imposed Tuscan as the national standard language in 
an attempt to unify the people through one common language. The distribution and of 
various regional languages and dialects via printed texts allowed for new forms of 
identities (that were not only linked to Latin) and made the creation of the modern nation-
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state possible, as it could now take on a more distinct language unique to its people and 
its territory.93 Before the Tuscan language was established as the national language, Latin 
coexisted alongside many regional languages and dialects. However, Latin was the 
literary language of the elites and was not spoken or used by the masses, who were 
mostly illiterate at the time and lacked the education or opportunity for classical studies. 
The decline of Latin and the promotion of the Tuscan language during the Renaissance 
and its rising popularity set the groundwork for it to become the national language, 
although the language would continue to evolve considerably over the centuries. The 
establishment of a national language that could differentiate the nation from others is an 
important element in Anderson’s theory, as his myth of the nation is seen through the 
development of communication channels. Later print capitalism and the distribution of 
the vernacular among the masses allowed the Italian peoples to better understand one 
another and communicate, which was previously limited to the nobility who understood 
script-language.  
Anderson addresses the link between religion and the roots of nationalism when 
theorizing about the formation of the nation. Anderson claims that in 18th century 
Western Europe, the “dawn of nationalism” and the beginning of certain religious modes 
of thought came to be. The period of the Enlightenment brought with it a decline in 
religious thought and practice and the rise of rationalist secularism, where which “death 
became arbitrary” and the once faithful began to reflect on the “absurdity of salvation.”94 
Such religious uncertainties meant that people needed a new continuity or permanence 
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with which to identify, one that also provided fraternity and created new ways to be 
linked. Nationalism was the secular alternative to explaining and understanding human 
suffering, which had once been explained by religious thought. While religious power 
declined during Italy’s Enlightenment and rationalism became the popular mode of 
thinking, secularism was never able to fully come to fruition in Italy like it did elsewhere 
in Europe. The geographical location of the Vatican within Rome and the existence of the 
Papal States were a physical barrier to the separation of government and religious 
institutions. From the eighth century until Unification, the pope was simultaneously a 
powerful secular and religious ruler throughout the peninsula. The presence and influence 
of the Church prevented the abolition of religious modes of thinking and religious forms 
of fraternity and community. Even during periods of decline in political or social power, 
the Church still endured as a cultural influence and community center, such as its role 
throughout the Renaissance. There was not a need for a sense of belonging through 
national identity when people had community through the Church and a sense of 
belonging to their city-state and regional identity.  
It was not until the Risorgimento that the people began to experience nationalistic 
sentiments, but even then it was driven by economic aims and outside social influences. 
The Romanticism movement was circulating around Europe and instilling nationalistic 
attitudes, however, the movement was the weakest in Italy. The push toward Unification, 
while fueled by nationalistic writings at the time, was ignited by desire for economic 
development. Various foreign powers had ruled the territory since the fall of the Roman 
Empire, which prevented full economic and cultural unity. As Anderson suggested, 
nations and national identities are constructed imagined communities. However, 
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Unification did not address the issues that the Risorgimento movement had hoped for and 
the culmination of social, political, and economic issues led to a diaspora.  
Following Anderson’s theory, Italy’s national identity was no accident; it was 
actively constructed abroad along political, cultural, and linguistic lines through 
international measures taken by the state.95 The State responded to mass emigration with 
the further construction of the Italian identity as a way to unite its emigrants and create 
ties to one specific land. Anderson theorized that belonging to a nation depends more on 
individual perceptions than objective factors, such as borders and natural resources. The 
nation building that took place during the diaspora was unifying through creating 
relationships and community, whereas Italian Unification from 1861-1871 was merely 
geographical unification of the peninsula. Before Unification, Italian politician and 
activist Giuseppe Mazzini described the Italian people as “soldiers without a banner,”96 
but even after they were unified and gained their banner it did not initially hold any 
ideological value as the people did not identity with the banner. With one sixth of Italy’s 
population residing outside of Italy’s borders by 191197, there was a feeling of the nation 
as being beyond its borders. An Italian community had to be fostered abroad, creating a 
notion of an “expanded state”98 that did not just rely on the sense of shared territory but 
rather on the sense of a shared cultural background and feeling of community. The State 
                                                        
95 Choate, Mark I. Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press 2008. Print. 
96 Choate, Mark I. Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad Pg. 6. Original quote translated 
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97 Choate, Mark I.  "Italy at Home and Abroad After 150 Years: The Legacy of Emigration and 
the Future of Italianità" Pg. 54. 
98 The idea of Italy as an “expanded state” or an extended state was taken from Mark Choate’s 
Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad pg. 8. 
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had a political agenda when constructing this community, and as Anderson theorized, 
Italian identity arose from a coordinated effort by a few elites or in this case the leaders 
of the country. While the State initially worried about emigration, it chose to promote it 
in order to ease economic troubles at home. However, “for Italy to gain benefits from its 
emigrants, the fruits of their sacrifices would have to return home.”99 The State did this 
through promoting migration while assuring citizenship to all those who returned, and 
those who returned brought back experience and capital. For those who could not yet 
return or did not want to, the State collaborated with receiving countries, such as the 
United States, to set up channels through which remittances could be sent back to Italy.100 
In addition, the State promoted standard Italian so that migrants from different regions 
could communicate with each other and it promoted Catholicism to unify Italians in 
Protestant countries. Italian identity needed to be framed around the transnational-
mobility of its people if it were to return or even endure.101 
From Anderson’s theory, it follows that if identity can be actively constructed to 
create and connect us through imagined communities, than it can also be altered. Large-
scale immigration can lead to rapid demographic change and thus challenge notions of 
national identity, but if these notions were to change they would no longer be threatened 
by immigration.102 As I have demonstrated, the Italian government was able to construct 
identity using various state apparatuses but it can also alter the way Italian identity is 
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defined in order to foster greater inclusiveness and alter perceptions of immigrants within 
the country.   
 43 
3.0 MIGRANTS AND THE MEDIA IN ITALY 
In this section, I begin by examining the relationship between Italian print media 
and national broadcast television with specific political parties and actors, primarily 
focusing on Silvio Berlusconi and the Lega Nord. Attitudes and assumptions towards 
migrants are largely influenced by what is seen and heard on the news through various 
media outlets. By creating powerful images and using emotionally provocative discourse, 
the media can influence the audience’s perception of and reaction to otherness. The 
media’s ability to shape ideas that touch our subconscious thinking becomes even more 
important when the majority of its audience has not come into direct contact with the 
‘others’.103  
In her study of media discourse on migrants and its impact on society’s tolerance, 
journalist and professor Denitza Kamenova describes the cultural power of what is 
produced by the mass media to unconsciously influence the audience and public opinion. 
According to social psychology, social learning takes place when the audience pulls 
messages and arguments from the content they are repeatedly exposed.104 “Also what 
counts is not only the length, context, the presentation of the message and its 
attractiveness and authenticity, but also the level of trust and sympathy that the 
reader/viewer has in the source of information, in the media.”105 Kamenova emphasizes 
that because of their unawareness of the importance of this trust, journalists often 
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underestimate their own strength and ability to influence public opinion and overlook the 
potential danger of their messages.  
In Italy, the Lega Nord is able to promote a specific notion of Italian identity that 
serves its political agenda of forming a homogenous, autonomous North through its 
alliance with Berlusconi’s political party Forza Italia. Berlusconi’s media ownership and 
control enabled the Lega Nord to manipulate the media and create a narrative around 
immigration that portrays migrants as threats to specific aspects of Italian identity, which 
have been emphasized by the Lega. In this section I consider the ways the past is used to 
impact current migration policy by analyzing the way Italian identity has been used by 
the Italian media to construct images of immigrants as threatening cultural values. I 
demonstrate how Italian discourse employs symbols to construct images of migrants and 
refugees as invaders and “others within” the Italian nation through differentiating 
migrants based on the elements of identity I identified in the first section (Catholic, 
Whiteness, and ties to the land). Due to the exclusive and fixed nature of the elements of 
Italian identity, I argue that specific migrant groups will continue to be perceived as 
incompatible if the discourse of the political parties and actors are perpetuated by the 
media, which continues to describe them as being a threat to these elements of identity.  
3.1 Context: Recent Migration into Italy 
Within the past decade or so, migrants have been steadily coming to Italy and 
much of the European Union, and there is a growing presence of second-generation 
migrants in the country. “Southern European countries have become a major destination 
for international migration in the last 20 years,” which has been due to their porous 
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boundaries, geographical proximity, and economic demand.106 Beginning in the 1990s 
and continuing up until today, many undocumented migrants from Africa have been 
crossing the Mediterranean Sea to reach Italy. Simultaneously, the 2015 Refugee Crisis 
resulted in hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Middle East streaming into 
Europe.107  Political upheaval in the Middle East has transformed migration patterns to 
Europe, beginning with the Arab Spring in Libya in 2011 and continuing to the Syrian 
refugee crisis that began in 2015.108 According to the Council on Foreign Relations, “The 
Central Mediterranean passage connecting Libya to Italy was the most trafficked route 
for Europe-bound migrants in 2014; Frontex reported more than 170,000 illegal border 
crossings into Italy.”109 These numbers of migrants crossing into Italy have remained this 
high throughout 2015 and into 2016 as well. Due to a lack of budget and resources, 
Mediterranean countries such as Italy have been unable to keep up with the demands and 
needs of the refugees arriving.110 
3.2 Political Actors and Media Strategy 
Before addressing current portrayals of migrants in the Italian media, I begin by 
explaining the function of the media in Italy and its history of migrant portrayal in order 
to understand the relationship between national news media and political actors. The 
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characterization of Italian identity as encompassing Catholicism, Whiteness, and ties to 
the land are perpetuated by the media due to the Lega Nord’s relationship with Silvio 
Berlusconi, a media tycoon who was also prime minister and therefore could influence 
the media’s agenda and propagate ideas and perceptions that advanced the coalition’s 
political ends. This influence of the media is because there is a dependent economic-
political relationship in Italy between ‘business empires’ and ‘political powers,’ where 
the four largest national newspapers “all are dependent upon large financial groups which 
are all, in turn, deeply involved in politics.” 111  
In this section, I demonstrate how the discourse of the Lega Nord has tried to 
capitalize on recent immigration to serve their own agenda of creating a homogenous, 
autonomous Northern Italy by harnessing the media to promote specific aspects of 
Italianità in order to depict migrants as outsiders and threats. This depiction serves the 
Lega Nord’s agenda of creating a homogenous, autonomous North while the alliance 
allows Berlusconi and his party Forza Italia to remain in control of the government. 
Consequently Lega Nord discourse, broadcast by the media, was able to influence the 
parameters of the immigration debate and affect policy. In her research on media 
representations of immigrants in Italy, historian Giovanna Campani identities three 
periods of distinct media reactions towards immigrants in Italian media that followed this 
shift in net immigration, which I identify and speak of in this section in relation to the rise 
of the Lega Nord.  
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3.2.1 Phase One 
When the first wave of immigrants from Africa, Asia, and Latin America initially 
began entering the country in the 1980s, the news outlets reflected the public’s overall 
curiosity, tolerance, and mild fear towards the immigrants. There was no observable 
alarm regarding immigration in the first half of the decade as it seemed to be 
overshadowed by other conflicts in political discourse.112 One reason for this acceptance 
could be attributed to the fact that the immigration numbers were small and the duration 
of their stay in the country was unclear. A second and more significant explanation could 
be that the Lega Nord political party did not yet exist or elicit the media to do its specific 
political work.  
The Lega Nord per l’indipendenza della Padania, or the Lega Nord (“Northern 
League), is the regionalist political party in Italy that promotes special rights for the 
Northern region of the country and was founded in 1991 with the intention of 
transforming Italy into a federalist state.113 Much of the party’s discourse focuses on 
“Italian” pride and resentment towards the South and mobilizes against immigration and 
multiculturalism. Like other more extreme right-wing parties, “their program is directed 
toward strengthening the nation by making it more ethnically homogenous and by 
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returning to traditional values.”114 The party exploits negative attitudes and resentment 
against undocumented immigrants and is particularly tough on immigration from Muslim 
countries, as they are not viewed as protecting or promoting the Italian Christian identity. 
However, the Lega Nord was not formed until the end of this phase.   
By the mid to late 1980s, fear, intolerance, and some acts of racist violence 
accompanied these new demographic changes although reactions and attitudes among 
Italians varied across the spectrum. “In the first phase, the leftist parties defend the notion 
of the multicultural society (which is quite a vague concept in Italy at the time); the 
Christian Democrats are fearful of irritating the Catholic Church, which sees the 
immigrants as the ‘new poor’ of the world; and the Socialists, including the law-maker 
Martelli, insist on the fact that Italy is an economically powerful country which needs 
immigrants.”115 By the 1990s, immigration from outside the European Union became 
noticeable, although still limited, and concern grew as the media devoted more attention 
to immigration.116 In this phase, the typical non-EU migrant was a black male from sub-
Saharan Africa, and so the media portrayed a ‘racialization’ regarding the representation 
of immigrants. The identification of the ethnicity of the criminals “contributed to the 
imprinting on the public imagination of a stereotyped image of immigration.”117 Darker 
skin became associated with danger and crime, as the ethnic, national, or racial 
                                                        
114 Originally quoted from Jens Rydgren’s article, “The Sociology of the Radical Right” in the 
Annual Review of Sociology 33 (2007): 242-243. Cited from page 158 of Monica Colombo’s 
article, “Discourse and politics of migration in Italy: The production and reproduction of ethnic 
dominance and exclusion” in the Journal of Language and Politics (2013).  
115Giovanna Campani’s section “The Italian Case” in Media and Migration: Constructions of 
Mobility and Difference (2013) Pg 44 
116 Mazzoleni, GianPietro, Julianne Stewart, and Bruce Horsfield. The media and neo-populism: a 
contemporary comparative analysis. Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 2003.  
117 Mazzoleni, GianPietro, Julianne Stewart, and Bruce Horsfield. The media and neo-populism: a 
contemporary comparative analysis. Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 2003. Pg. 77. 
 49 
backgrounds of the migrants were always mentioned or depicted in the media when 
reporting on infraction or criminal offenses committed by migrants. The 1990s were 
categorized by public fear of “the putative social effects of non-EU immigration; they felt 
their living spaces were being invaded” which created the ideal conditions for the rise of 
the political party Lega Nord.118  
During this phase, the leading daily newspapers almost always supported the 
party in government due to this financial dependence, and there have been few instances 
of support for the opposition.119 Public television networks Rai 1, Rai 2, and Rai 3 are 
also under the influence of these political forces. This relationship created a situation that 
is found more in Italian media than in other Western countries, which is the lack of 
‘autonomous journalism’ or “that is to say a journalism based above all on the quality of 
the information and on the objective of trying to obtain the support of the audience 
through the quality of information provided.”120 Historically, the traditional dependence 
of the Italian media on party ideology was the major factor limiting its capacity to 
exercise autonomous reporting to the public.121 This situation persisted into the 1980s 
until the Italian media underwent transformations that resulted in the introduction of 
private television channels and an increase in the concentration of media ownership.  
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This stage of immigration into Italy also included Cape Verdean and Filipino 
women who migrated to Italy for employment as domestic helpers, particularly as live-in 
maids. Campani notes, “and because of the nature of this specific activity – caring, 
helping, based in the home, etc. – the image of migrant women (most of whom, 
incidentally, came from Catholic countries) was reassuring, compared to the media image 
of men at this stage, who were, as we have seen, largely portrayed as black-faced exotic 
strangers from Africa.”122 Migrant women were initially perceived as being compatible 
with Italian culture, as their religious identities were also Catholic and the nature of their 
work involved family care. Black African men, on the other hand, were perceived as 
being incompatible with Italian culture because they could not be as easily linked to 
family involvement and child care, an important feature of Italian culture. This image of 
the typical female migrant would change within the coming years, as Islamic women and 
women trafficked for prostitution into Italy would also invoke charged images of slavery, 
sex, and criminality. The religious and cultural elements that made the female migrants 
appear harmless and compatible with Italian society no longer marked their identities.  
3.2.2 Phase Two 
The second wave of immigration to Italy featured a change in the origin of the 
immigrants, beginning with Albanians in 1991 as well as others coming from territories 
in the Balkan region, such as those involved in the break up of former Yugoslavia and the 
collapse of Eastern European Communist regimes.123 The image of the migrant was thus 
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no longer dominated by images of African males, as this category now included Eastern 
European men and women. Campani notes that media portrayal of the migrants within 
this phase are more “marked” and described that they are wild people fleeing a war torn 
land. “The migrant is an Albanian or a Slav, sometimes even a Slavonic Albanian (sic). 
This Italian media display[ed] a comprehensive ignorance of the complex ethnic relations 
of the Balkan region.”124 In particular, the Romani people received the harshest media 
depictions, being portrayed not only as wild people, but also as “dangerous and prone to 
theft and violence.”125 The Romani remain the most discriminated group to this day, 
partly due to historic prejudice reinforced by negative media depictions.126   
Initially during this phase, the majority of the Italian public responded with 
empathy towards the Albanian refugees, but as the immigration steadily continued, “by 
the early 1990s Albanians and people from the former Yugoslavia (especially Roma) 
become the main victims of intolerance and racism (Lapov, 1998).”127 Increasingly, the 
Albanians became associated with Italian Southerners, “the primordial order against 
which Italian national identity was articulated historically.”128  Albanian migrants, much 
like Southern Italians, began to be perceived as “the other” and thus as incompatible with 
Italian identity. Albanian immigration in smaller numbers did not initially appear 
threatening to most of the public because small-scale immigration did not elicit the social 
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changes that tend to accompany large-scale immigration, such as demographic changes or 
perceived job competition with immigrants. Power structures may not have appeared to 
have been challenged or threatened until large-scale immigration took place.  
During this time, many Albanian migrants accused the media of portraying them 
as the ‘constitutive other’ through stereotyping and “fabricating a de-humanised 
Albanian, monster, connotation backwardness, ferociousness, immorality and abject 
poverty” which resulted in their social exclusion and marginalization.129 “Unwittingly, 
they [Albanian migrants] found themselves trapped in a discursive field magnetized by 
the opposition between a cultural construction of the North as civilized, efficient and 
‘European’ and a symmetrical cultural construction of the South as uncivilized, 
inefficient and ‘African’.”130 Albanian migrants, while initially discursively being 
grouped with Southern Italians due to perceived links such as poverty and complexion, 
were now being further subdivided into their own category linked to specific ethnic 
stereotypes and images produced by the media.131 Accordingly, a nation or groups within 
a nation define themselves in relation to the differences within its borders. Large-scale 
immigration altered the perception of “other” from Southern Italians to the immigrants 
themselves.  
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Campani notes that while the previous period initially viewed the refugee and 
migrant with a certain degree of pity and victimhood, the second phase saw the increased 
anxiety surrounding migrants and the production of the invasion metaphor. The 
government began the expulsion of Albanians as the media reiterated the danger of 
immigration, which could only be prevented by stopping it altogether. National news 
confused ethnic identities of Eastern Europeans when reporting on immigration and 
reports of some Albanian involvement in human trafficking led to an association of 
Albanian immigrants with both human and drug trafficking, an association with 
criminality which endures today.  
 Simultaneously during this phase, the move of “media practitioners to high-level 
politicians” was happening, which was the case for both Giovanni Spadolini, the editor of 
Il Corriere della Sera who became the leader of the Republican Party before becoming 
Prime Minister, and Silvio Berlusconi, who also made a similar move from media mogul 
to Prime Minister.132 During this time, particular government actors and political parties 
benefited or forwarded their agenda by exploiting this relationship. Campani writes, “this 
engagement in politics is often an instrument to obtain material economic benefits for the 
industrial group in question. The Berlusconi group owns Il Giornale133, the weekly 
review Panorama and three television stations – Italia Uno, Canale Cinque and 
Retequattro” (52).134 The problematic relationship where major news media is financially 
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dependent on political parties or specific political actors is most clearly revealed in the 
actions of three actors: Silvio Berlusconi and his political party Forza Italia, as well as the 
Lega Nord. 
Berlusconi dominated Italian politics for two decades as the third-longest serving 
Prime Minister of Italy since Unification, in addition to being a media tycoon who owns 
Mediaset S.p.A. (or Gruppo Mediaset), the largest commercial broadcaster in Italy. This 
direct involvement in national media allowed Berlusconi to launch massive campaigns 
via electoral advertisements on his three TV networks. After initially being elected in 
1994, he was forced to resign but later ran and won again in 2001. “Even though his 
government lasted only for six months and had little impact on public policy, it made the 
issue of Berlusconi’s conflict of interests already extremely salient: it was considered 
highly problematic that a prime minister could lead a country while retaining ownership 
of half of the television market (Mediaset) and indirect control over the remaining half 
(Rai135).”136 Eventually Berlusconi would run and win two more times in 2008 and 2013, 
enabling his political allies the Lega Nord to extract demands on policy and rhetoric 
around migrants. Berlusconi owned media companies would then promote to serve the 
electoral interests of the Lega Nord. Throughout his time as Prime Minister, Berlusconi 
was able to promote his party’s ideology through the various media channels controlled 
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by him and his party. Campani writes, “The extreme case is that of Berlusconi, where it is 
possible to speak of a sort of soft totalitarianism through the media, using the media to 
promote a political career and to hide the scandals (the biggest of which is of course the 
ownership of the country’s largest private media empire by a powerful politician who at 
one time was prime minister).”137 Once Berlusconi and the Lega Nord created an 
alliance, the Lega were also able to capitalize on Berlusconi’s media advantage. 
However, the Lega Nord’s impact on policymaking occurred during the second of 
Silvio Berlusconi’s terms as Prime Minister in 2001. The Lega Nord has had a 
complicated relationship with the Italian media, as the media has at separate times 
persecuted them and endorsed their political messages. Likewise, “the Lega Nord has 
also adopted innovative, even transgressive, communication strategies, succeeding in 
both attacking the dominant logic of the media system and activating a new media logic 
to ensure its own visibility in the various phases of development.”138 These 
communication strategies have included using attention-grabbing statements or actions 
and asserting ‘issue ownership’ over key themes, which have become associated with the 
Lega in the media and with voters.139 During the 1980s and 90s, the Lega used any 
hostile media coverage of their party to their advantage by using it to promote their 
propaganda. However, after the party’s regional electoral success in the 1990s, a number 
of journalists and business leaders began to openly support the Lega Nord and their 
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policies, and media coverage of the party became more frequent and positive.140 Their 
success in gaining the public’s and media’s attention has been attributed to the Lega’s 
ability to put forth a convincing narrative about the party’s success in government to its 
members and supporters and by continually proposing new policies on high-profile topics 
in Italian politics, such as security and immigration.141 In addition, “many political 
commentators considered the Lega Nord to be an alternative to the old party system and 
to the typical Rome-centered politics.”142 The media soon began to legitimize the Lega 
Nord by defending their achievements and their policy stances, noting that they were 
based on real problems existing in the Northern regions. The Lega Nord became a 
symbolic instrument for combating traditional party power and soon specific journalists 
and newspapers took up positions that favored the Lega. 143 The Lega was able to gain 
traction by capitalizing on already existing fears and issues and establishing their place in 
Italian politics as the alternative party. 
By 1993, much of the media provided indirect support to the Lega Nord via 
heavily criticizing other more traditional parties. “The public television networks (Rai) 
openly took up a position in defense of the country’s unity and identity and in several 
programs assumed an active role in seeking to frame the Italian national identity.”144 The 
                                                        
140 Mazzoleni, GianPietro, Julianne Stewart, and Bruce Horsfield. The media and neo-populism: a 
contemporary comparative analysis. Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 2003. Pg. 79. 
141 Albertazzi, Daniele and McDonnell, Duncan. “The Lega Nord Back in Government.” West 
European Politics, 33.6 (2010). Pg. 1322. 
142 Mazzoleni, GianPietro, Julianne Stewart, and Bruce Horsfield. The media and neo-populism: a 
contemporary comparative analysis. Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 2003. Pg. 80. 
143 Mazzoleni, GianPietro, Julianne Stewart, and Bruce Horsfield. The media and neo-populism: a 
contemporary comparative analysis. Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 2003. Pg. 80. 
144Mazzoleni, GianPietro, Julianne Stewart, and Bruce Horsfield. The media and neo-populism: a 
contemporary comparative analysis. Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 2003. Pg. 83. It was also 
note that, “A study commissioned by Rai in the spring of 1993 revealed that questions of national 
unity and identity and the related issue of North/South differences were widely discussed on 
television (Survey “Italia Italie by Grossi 1994).” 
 57 
Rai channels and Mediaset network portrayed questions surrounding national identity and 
unity as a crisis in the country and gave voice to doubts and discourses, all of which were 
put forward by the Lega Nord.145 Conservative commentators and leading Italian dailies 
were in full support of the Lega Nord and their movement and presented them in a 
favorable way. Not surprisingly, during this time league policies matched up with those 
of major industrial, financial, and television interests.146  
Then in 1994, Berlusconi, in a strategic move to prevent the left and the Lega 
Nord from gaining more electoral ground, created and funded the Forza Italia party. At 
this time Berlusconi was the owner of the television network Mediaset. “A political 
movement thus arose from inside the media system,” Italian political communication 
researcher Roberto Biorcio writes. “Berlusconi exploited to the full the emotional 
attachment his media empire had established with his audience, as a substitute for the 
affective relations with voters that the traditional parties had built up in the past.”147 
Berlusconi’s party Forza Italia quickly formed an alliance with the Lega Nord, as well as 
Alleanza Nazionale, and the coalition won the 1994 general elections. However, shortly 
after, the Lega’s leader Umberto Bossi broke away from Berlusconi and radicalized the 
party further by abandoning federalism and calling for full northern independence in 
order to preserve the party’s voter base and prevent more votes from being lost to Forza 
Italia in the future. “In order to overcome its marginal political position, the Lega Nord’s 
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policy was now to agitate for the establishment of the “Padana Nation,” by means of the 
predictable recourse to symbols, rituals, and myths that is part of inventing tradition 
(Hobsbawn and Ranger 1983).”148 The party’s radicalization resulted in further isolation 
and a return to negative press coverage.  
3.2.3 Phase Three 
The 1996 Dini Decree marks the third phase of immigration, as it was the first 
effort to implement immigration policy since the Martelli Law of 1990. The Martelli law 
was the first successful attempt at creating migration policy.149 The previous decade had 
been characterized by migration to Italy without a legal framework. The Martelli law 
created reception centers and tried to regularize immigration by setting a quota and 
reforming deportation procedures to narrow the flow.150 However, after the Martelli law, 
refugees continued to come from Albania and the former Yugoslavia, as well as a 
continuous flow from Somalia, and immigration in Italy was being redefined as an 
emergency. The Dini Decree was passed in November of 1996 and allowed for the 
regularization of almost 300,000 undocumented immigrants and introduced more severe 
measures against smuggling and trafficking.151 This period consisted of the creation of 
contradictory immigration processes implemented by the government following the Dini 
Decree. The first Berlusconi government was an assortment of different stances toward 
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migration, but with the later influence of the Lega Nord, it adopted the Dini Decree, a 
more radical and hardline approach towards migration.   
While this phase of media reactions to immigrants does not focus on one 
particular regional or ethnic group of migrants like the other two phases did, it was 
characterized by a distinct public discourse about migrants and how the reactions towards 
their presence produced legal consequences. National newspapers presented the 
immigration situation as potentially beneficial to the economy, which needed more 
workers in specific sectors, but also as dangerous due to the presence of a significant 
number of undocumented migrants in the country. “The media point of view on migration 
– useful if well-controlled but otherwise dangerous – seldom considers the structural 
aspects of the Italian system that produce favorable conditions for illegal immigration. 
Hence readers and listeners hear little about the huge informal labor market in Italy; 
about the long established system of crime in Italy which exploits immigrants and 
involves them in trafficking; about the corruption of parts of the police about visa-selling 
scams at Italian embassies and consulates abroad […]”152 In this way, the media painted a 
picture of immigration that did not include revealing the ways the immigration system 
failed and produced the conditions for undocumented migration. Rather, by ignoring this 
narrative and stressing the incompatibility of the migrants with certain Italian identity 
elements, the media promoted a specific agenda that served the platform of the Lega 
Nord. 
After years of isolation, Bossi formed a new pact with Berlusconi in 1999 and the 
alliance restored the Lega Nord’s political importance within Italy once again. The Lega 
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Nord participated in the 2001-2006 government due to this alliance formed with then 
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s party Forza Italia. “Having lasted less than a year in 
the first Berlusconi-led coalition in 1994, the Lega not only managed to survive for four 
years in the second Berlusconi government, but succeeded in presenting itself 
simultaneously as both ‘the opposition within government’ and a driving force behind 
high-profile areas of government policy.”153 Doing so allowed the party to have a say in 
the creation of an immigration policy reflective of their ideology and assumptions 
towards immigrants and their role in Italian society.  
Throughout his time as Prime Minister, Berlusconi’s government made efforts to 
limit illegal immigration via the Bossi-Fini law in 2002, named in part after Lega Nord 
leader Umberto Bossi, which ordered the arrest of undocumented immigrants and their 
confinement to detention centers as they awaited their identification and expulsion made 
possible by a series of bilateral agreements with Italy and its surrounding neighbor 
countries. “The salience of immigration reflected Bossi’s demand to make it a key issue 
in the CdL’s [Casa delle Libertà]154 formal electoral pact signed with Berlusconi in 
exchange for the LN’s [Lega Nord] guarantee of full support for the government 
(Corriere della Sera, 2001a). This formal electoral pact ensured that the CdL was 
formally bound to Bossi’s electoral priorities and that Berlusconi could be held 
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accountable throughout the term (Corriere della Sera, 2001b).”155 The law, although 
designed to solve the problem of immigration after repeated accusations that the 
government was too lenient and tolerant toward illegal immigration, was severely 
criticized for being too harsh and restrictive.156 One of its greatest critiques resulted from 
the new ability to return immigrants found in international waters back to their previous 
country, which was a power granted that formerly fell outside of the patrolling duties of 
the Italian Navy. Its harsh nature and criminalizing policies were attributed to the law 
incorporating the Lega Nord’s restrictive approach to immigration. After Berlusconi won 
again in 2006, the alliance was able to affect immigration policy once more by passing a 
controversial bill in 2008 that made illegal immigration a punishable offense.157 During 
this time, the Lega Nord made significant gains in policy on “la sicurezza,” which 
translates to “security” and encompasses both immigration and law and order, by 
claiming that the Italian people are under attack.158  
The Lega Nord’s concern with immigration also extended to suggesting measures 
monitoring Muslims in the name of security. In 2008 a “security practice” was introduced 
that dealt with a number of security issues such as various punishments for different 
offenses such as ‘the crime of illegal immigration.’ The Lega proposed a number of 
resolutions to this package, which included making it compulsory for Muslims to hold 
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religious gatherings and celebrate rites in Italian, restricting granting of permits to build 
mosques only following local referendums, and granting mayors the command to deport 
illegal immigrants.159 Although these resolutions were never realized, they reflect the 
Lega’s commitment to implementing policy that helps them get the North closer to 
homogeneity and independence.  
In summary, after forming a coalition with Berlusconi and his party Forza Italia, 
the discourse of the Lega Nord was able to influence the parameters of the immigration 
debate. “Similarly to what happened in other European countries, in Italy it was the 
extreme right, notably the Lega Nord (since its first electoral success at the beginning of 
the ‘90s), that put immigration at the centre of the political agenda and defined the terms 
of the debate under the heading of populist slogans.”160 The Lega’s ability to reach a 
larger audience was an effect of forming an alliance with Berlusconi, which increased 
their available media platform. Since Berlusconi’s government, the Lega Nord has gone 
through phases of waning and rising popularity.161 In 2013, European Parliament member 
Matteo Salvini replaced Bossi as the new leader of the Lega Nord. Salvini’s leadership 
has resulted in the Lega Nord embracing a very critical view of the European Union and a 
very strong anti-immigration stance, among the party’s most notable policy stance 
changes. While the party experienced some fluctuations with voters and their popularity 
has lessened significantly after Berlusconi’s second cabinet, it made large gains once 
again in 2015 following the immigration crisis in Italy with the influx of refugees and the 
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party has continued to make gains in Italian elections since Salvini was elected president 
of the Lega.  
3.3 Current Media Portrayals and Political Discourse 
Italy is becoming more multi-ethnic “in terms of the number of residents, 
participation in the labor market, transition to self-employment, mixed marriages, and the 
origin of students in schools.”162 However, the predominant opinions throughout the 
country do not reflect the growing multiethnic makeup, and popular opinion “rejects the 
idea of giving a place to immigration in the nation’s social organization, and this position 
is strengthened by political forces and by media that reflect and exacerbate the 
reaction.”163 Studies have shown that “given that members of the public primarily learn 
about politics via mass media – the news and information they convey – the credibility 
and legitimacy of news media are of utmost importance”164 in regards to their ability to 
shape public perceptions.  
In addition, government actors and political parties use perceptions of others to 
promote their agenda, gain public support, and influence policy that can actively work 
against the best interests of undocumented migrants and refugees in Italy. In Italy, like 
many European countries, immigration is commonly referred to as an invasion and threat. 
“The Italian political elites and media have played a crucial role in the spreading and 
legitimating of both overt and covert forms of xenophobia and racist discourse over 
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time.”165 This is largely done through the othering process that occurs, which is the 
tendency of certain individual or groups to be mentally categorized as ‘not one of us’.166 
Studies have found that, “there is considerable evidence of a normalization of “othering” 
in political discourse, and there is much to indicate that this is also occurring at all levels 
of discourse, ranging from the media, political parties, and institutions to everyday 
life.”167 Since political actors and parties, such as Berlusconi and the Lega Nord, are 
interested in maintaining the current power structure and can influence the narratives 
produced by the mass media, they therefore have a say in how public debate surrounding 
certain issues is shaped. “The media are in essence a contested space in which the most 
powerful groups can establish the dominance of specific messages.”168 These messages 
can lead the public to certain political conclusions about immigration and the groups of 
people entering the country. While this discourse may begin in the media or stem from 
individual actors or political parties, it can quickly diffuse and integrate into society. So 
how are migrants in Italy described in national news and political discourse and in what 
ways are they differentiated or constructed as the ‘other’?   
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The Lega Nord promotes the idea that immigrants are not compatible with Italian 
identity using the framework of particular economic and social issues that concern the 
public.169 As previously mentioned, the party and its leadership are well known for 
evoking the image of an “immigrant invasion” where the immigrant is implied to be 
coming to take jobs away from hardworking citizens and to drain state resources. The 
party often links these fears to Italian cultural identity as well, describing them as threats 
to economic and social issues as well as threatening to the Christian identity, for example. 
The perceived threat imposed by Muslim immigrants challenges the religious identity of 
the nation that is grounded in Catholicism. “In general, the Lega has employed an ethno-
populist discourse in relation to the immigration theme, using the ‘invasion’ metaphor 
and presenting immigrants as a threat to local and national identity (particularly Muslim 
immigrants), as a threat to national security and responsible for rising crime, a drain on 
economic resources (unfairly receiving preferential access to welfare resources) and 
illegitimate competitors in the job market.”170 Their invasion is presented as a threat to 
the Italian people on multiple fronts as cultural, religious, security and economic threats.    
In particular, Lega Nord leader Matteo Salvini often refers to this immigrant 
invasion metaphor. During an interview with radio station RTL171 last September, Salvini 
was quoted as saying, “I do not believe in a refugee emergency. We are faced with a 
                                                        
169 Much of the Lega-Nord’s discourse could be found in La Padania, a pro-Lega Nord daily 
newpaper that was established in 1997 and founded by Umberto Bossi. Due to financial 
difficulties, the newspaper has been suspended as of December 2014. “Other media owned by the 
Lega Nord, the television station Telepadania and the radio station Radio Padania Libera also 
contribute further to the ongoing negative discourses about immigrants” (231). Andizzoni, 
Michela, and Chiara Ferrari. Beyond Monopoly: Globalization and Contemporary Italian Media. 
Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2010.  
170 Immigration and Discrimination in Italy: Institutional Patterns and Political and Civil Society 
Responses. Pg. 5.  
171 RTL102.5 (Radio Transmissioni Lombarde) is a private Italian radio station.  
 66 
planned, financed and organized mass invasion. The aim of this strategy is to replace the 
Europeans with other nations to have masses of new workers who can be exploited for 
three euros per hour.”172 Not only does Salvini describe the immigration as an invasion, 
but he also emphasizes that it is premeditated and calculated, which does not evoke the 
image of a refugee fleeing their home in search of safety. Rather, his description is meant 
to elicit the image of large numbers of undocumented migrants entering the country in 
order to exploit its resources and take jobs away from citizens. 
Regional and national identities are being challenged by race in Italy, as the 
country has experienced mass immigration from impoverished African nations. Being 
‘black’ has become the primary demarcation of ‘other’ or difference in Italy. “In Italy 
where regional identity is intertwined with racialized thinking and structural racism, 
Southern Italians have been categorized in distinction from lighter skinned Northern 
Italians and discriminated against in northern cities. But in the contemporary context of 
neoliberal globalization and the influx of immigrants beginning in the late 1980s, 
Southern Italians are now in a position of greater privilege as citizen insiders vis à vis 
“blacks” (“Neri” and “Marrochino”).”173 These attitudes reflect the traditional regional 
North-South distinction based on complexion that have historically marginalized 
Southern Italians. Due to this distinction these attitudes are often harnessed by the Lega 
Nord which uses race to subtly construct the Black migrant as a threat and as an outsider. 
This construction of the Black migrant reinforces the Lega’s stance towards Northern 
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independence and historic exclusion of Southerners, which is now used in their rhetoric 
to exclude Black migrants.   
Governor of the northern region of Veneto and member of the Lega Nord Luca 
Zaia linked African migrants to economic decline when he proclaimed that the sight of 
African migrants begging throughout the city would have a “devastating effect” on the 
tourism industry. Zaia rose to power in Veneto in 2010 and has especially gained public 
support and approval during the massive immigration to Italy in 2015 due to refugee 
crises. While he is well liked and considered “less extreme” than most of his fellow Lega 
Nord members, Zaia’s discourse has reflected the Lega Nord ideology toward 
immigration: restrictive and unwelcoming. “But Zaia’s rise in politics has included 
episodes that reveal his opposition to things deemed “too foreign” for Italy. As minister 
of agriculture in the government of Berlusconi, he defended authorities in Lucca and 
Milan when they began cracking down on restaurants that served non-Italian food, saying 
ethnic restaurants that served kebabs, sushi and Chinese food should “stop importing 
container loads of meat and fish from who knows where” and use only Italian 
ingredients.”174 Zaia’s statements reflect the Lega’s agenda of an autonomous North that 
attempts to protect northern farmers (primarily against EU interference) by championing 
the use of traditional Italian food products. 
In major national news sources, such as La Repubblica and Il Giornale, the 
othering process follows a similar pattern, although somewhat less hostile than the 
discourse employed by the Lega Nord. Through disaster and invasion metaphors, the 
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migrant is implied to be a threat to the nation and its unity.175 Headlines such as “The 
army of African refugees poorest among the new recruits” (“L’esercito dei poveri 
profughi dell’Africa tra le nuove reclute”176) and “The invasion of immigrants costs us 
55 million per month” (“L’invasione degli immigrati ci costa 55 milioni al mese177”) 
immediately produce threatening images of the migrant by describing them as an army, 
as invaders, as recruits, and as impoverished.  
In Il Giornale, the theme of immigrant invasion is reiterated in articles such as 
“Another 3,700 immigrants landed: the invasion by sea resumes” (“Sbarcati altri 3.700 
immigrati: riprende l’invasione via mare”178), where the opening sentence states “The 
invasion has never stopped,” before going on to describe the increase in immigration due 
to the arrival of Syrian refugees. Immigrants have also been compared with destruction 
when the sudden arrival of thousands and thousands of refugees was described as “a 
bomb explosion” in the article “The bomb of immigrants in Italy: In 2015 at least 200 
thousand arrivals” (La bomba immigrati sull’Italia: nel 2015 almeno 200 mila arrivi”179). 
Another article titled, “There are too many Christian symbols here!” Migrants strike in 
Lucca” (“Qui troppi simboli cristiani!” Migranti scioperano a Lucca”180) describes 
Pakistani immigrants who were striking because they were subject to too many Christian 
                                                        
175 Choate, Mark I.  "Italy at Home and Abroad After 150 Years: The Legacy of Emigration and 
the Future of Italianità." Introduction.  
176 “L’esercito dei poveri profughi dell’Africa tra le nuove reclute.” La Repubblica. July 10, 2016.  
177 Indini, Domenico Ferrara Andrea. “L’invasione Degli Immigrati Ci Costa 55 Milioni Al 
Mese.” IlGiornale.it. Il Giornale, 15 Nov. 2014. Web 20 May 2016.  
178 Rame, Sergio. “Sbarcati Altri 3.700 Immigrati: Riprende L’invasione via Mare.” IlGiornale.it. 
Il Giornale, 30 March 2016. Web. 15 July 2016. 
179 Indini, Andrea. “La bomba immigrati sull’Italia: nel 2015 almeno 200 mila arrivi.” 
IlGiornale.it. Il Giornale, 21 July 2015. Web 17 June 2016 
180 Bertocchi, Gabriele. “”Qui Troppi Simboli Cristiani!”. Migranti Scioperano a Lucca.” 
IlGiornale.it. Il Giornale, 19 July 2016. Web 20 July 2016. 
 69 
religious symbols at work, according to the author and the Italian witnesses questioned. 
In the article, the migrants are described as “la banda di stranieri” (a band of outsiders), 
repeatedly referred to as “gli stranieri” (the foreigners), and their protest is described as 
“ammutinarsi” (a mutiny). At no point are the immigrants interviewed or questioned 
about the reasoning behind their strike, rather the article relies on speculation and the 
testimonies of native born Italian witnesses. The author of the article closes with 
deliberating about the fate of the migrants, “Or maybe, more likely, they are not going to 
live in a Christian country.” Italy is often defined as a Catholic State in many of these 
articles, suggesting non-Christian immigrants must embrace this identity or go elsewhere. 
While not all national newspapers describe immigration along these lines, there is 
a general trend of media rhetoric employing these symbols and discursive patterns. It 
should be noted that the moderate daily newspaper Il Corriere della Sera does not quite 
follow this pattern of employing invasion and disaster metaphors. The news source 
publishes articles with both positive and negative stories linked to migrants and avoids 
using sensationized headlines, generally stating only the facts and using politically 
correct rather than emotionally charged terms. However, this newspaper has often been 
critical of figures such as Berlusconi, as he is not one of their major shareholders.  
3.4 Perceptions of Compatibility 
Due to the exclusive and fixed nature of the elements of Italian identity that I 
identified in the first section and demonstrated in this section (Catholic, Whiteness, and 
ties to the land), it is easier for the media to portray some migrants as “others” by 
emphasizing these traits opposed to other more inclusive aspects. As long as these 
elements are portrayed as being threatened by the media and within public discourse of 
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political parties and their leaders, specific migrant groups will continue to be perceived as 
incompatible with Italian culture. That is to say, as long as these elements are continually 
linked to “Italianess” and described as being “under attack”, they will continue to serve 
the Lega’s interests of creating a homogenous, independent Northern Italy.  
The discourse and media portrayal of immigration can reflect the government’s 
policies and project these attitudes to the public. The Lega Nord does not choose to cite 
language as a cultural element threatened by the presence of migrants because doing so 
would not best serve their political ends of a homogenous Italian society in the North, 
although they do promote the use of the Northern regional dialect. While language has 
been a huge part of their platform for regional independence, language is not called upon 
as a major part of the immigration discussion because it is not mutually exclusive; 
migrants can learn the Italian language while still knowing and speaking their own. 
However, race can serve these ends because it is fixed and therefore exclusive. An 
African migrant cannot change his skin complexion. 
The racism propagated by public discourse and media involves the covert 
negative opinions and attitudes that produce subtle actions and conditions of 
discrimination towards minorities. This is known as cultural racism, which is not based 
on biology and hierarchy, but on culture and difference and seemingly incompatible 
differences between culturally defined ethnic groups, which are described in cultural 
terms rather than by race.181 Cultural racism can draw on some elements of Italianità and 
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exclude others in accordance with the Lega agenda, such as excluding language from 
their discussion of immigration, as it does not serve their political purposes. Specific 
political parties such as the Lega Nord make more explicit links by mentioning the race 
of the migrants in question, such as linking African migrants to decreased tourism. While 
they do not specifically say the African migrant is inferior due to complexion, they list 
cultural reasons that are not viewed as being incompatible with Italian identity, and 
therefore unfit to be part of Italian society.  
A similar exclusivity dilemma exists for the religious facet of Italian identity 
because having a religious identity grounded specifically in Roman Catholicism is less 
inclusive than a more general religious identity that is based on a belief in one God. 
Additionally, specific religions can be viewed as more or less compatible based on their 
similarity to Roman Catholicism. Other Christian religions will be viewed more 
favorably than Islam for instance because they are all based on the life and teachings of 
Jesus Christ as found in the New Testament, whereas Islam follows the Qur’an which 
was written by the prophet Muhammad.  
Immigrants from Muslim countries are often subject to prejudice and stereotyping 
due to the association between Islam and terrorism put forth by the media. “These 
communities are often in the news due to anti-Islamic feelings constantly being whipped 
up by the Lega Nord and other center-right forced alongside sections of the Catholic 
Church.”182  There is also constant opposition to the building of mosques in the country 
due to media coverage describing “Islamic invasions.” In 2000, Cardinal Giacomo 
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Biffi183 made a public statement about Muslims, the same time the Lega Nord was 
opposing the building of a mosque in Lodi, which was covered by the national public 
service news broadcast Tg1.184 Biffi said, “Muslims are strangers to our humanity. 
Catholicism remains our historic religion and we need not worry about our national 
identity.”185 The same year, Biffi also issued a public statement recommending that Italy 
give Christian immigrants preference over Muslim immigrants in order to avoid a 
profound change in European and Italian culture.186 Biffi’s comments designate 
Catholicism as being the state religion and suggest that Muslims differ from the rest of 
humanity. Much of the discourse in the media surrounding Islam has been shaped by a 
cultural fear of what could happen to the national identity and culture of the country.187 
Based on the combination of these perceptions, African born Muslim men will face the 
greatest difficulties regarding being perceived as compatible within Italian society, or 
belonging within society. 
 By stressing certain aspects of Italian identity, the Lega Nord has created a 
political discourse that is hostile to migrants, especially to those from outside Europe 
because they lack historical and cultural similarities. This serves their agenda of creating 
a homogenous Northern society by promoting the fixed and exclusive aspects of Italianità 
that once served the purpose of differentiating Italian emigrants from their compatriots 
                                                        
183 Biffi was the Archbishop of Bologna before his death in July of 2015. 
184 Andizzoni, Michela, and Chiara Ferrari. Beyond Monopoly: Globalization and Contemporary 
Italian Media. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2010.  
185 Andizzoni, Michela, and Chiara Ferrari. Beyond Monopoly: Globalization and Contemporary 
Italian Media. Lanham, MD: :exington, 2010. Pg. 233. 
186 2000, 12:00AM BST 02 Oct, “News in Brief.” The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, 2 Oct. 
2000. Web. 20 July 2016. 
187 Islam as a cultural threat was a prominent narrative in much of Europe and especially Italy for 
the first decade of the twenty first century. However, the rise of radical Islam within the last five 
or more years has since overshadowed that narrative.  
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and unifying the Italy’s during the diaspora. However, Identity is not inherently fixed or 
exclusive but the Lega Nord has emphasized the elements of Italianità that seem absolute 
in order to construct migrants as others within.
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4.0 CONCLUSION 
The State’s construction of Italian identity during the Italian diaspora informed 
the way the Italian population perceives non-Italians as incompatible. The discourse of 
political parties, such as the Lega Nord and Forza Italia, has tried to capitalize on recent 
immigration to advance their own agenda by using the media to promote specific aspects 
of Italian identity. Researcher Waddick Doyle, when discussing Italian identity, describes 
it as “an aspirational identity” that “was created by a narrative of heading toward a 
national future.”188 The nation building during the Italian Diaspora created a narrative of 
Italian identity that pulled from the people’s cultural past but was clearly aspirational in 
that it was constructed with the hopes of uniting the people and tying the emigrants to the 
land. The Lega Nord has been successful with their discussion of immigration because 
they appeal to the insecurity of disunity and lack of belonging that have historically 
plagued Italy since Unification and the nation-building that attempted to construct a 
national identity.  
The Lega Nord has created a political discourse that is hostile to migrants in order 
to achieve their goal of homogeneity and autonomy of the North. Their alliance with 
Forza Italia and Berlusconi during his times as Prime Minister has enabled the Lega to 
harness the media in order to reach a larger audience and influence the parameters of the 
immigration debate. The salience of their message has increased with recent refugee 
crises in Italy, which have further increased security concerns and fear of the other. 
                                                        
188 Vogt, Roland, Cristaudo, Wayne, and Leutzsch, Andreas, eds. European National Identities: 
Elements, Transitions, Conflicts (1). Piscataway, US: Transaction Publishers, 2014. ProQuest 
ebrary. Web. Pg. 114.  
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4.1 Future Research 
If I were continuing this research, I would theorize which of the other components 
of Italianità could be emphasized to create a more inclusive identity. As Anderson 
suggested, nations and national identities are constructed imagined communities. From 
this theory, it follows that if identity can be actively constructed to create and connect us 
through imagined communities, then it can also be altered. The unifying elements of 
Italian identity that I have discussed in this paper offer a way to envision a collective 
Italian identity according to a few elements or themes that appear throughout most of the 
country and are most often called upon in national Italian news during the ‘othering’ 
process. As I have demonstrated in the previous section, various political actors actively 
constructed the Italian identity and parties who have chosen to emphasize exclusive and 
fixed aspects of this identity, which they were able to broadcast and perpetuate through 
the media. However, what constitutes the Italian identity is much more unclear and 
fragmentary when it is not being evoked by media to pin the citizens against a common 
enemy such as the immigrant. The Italian identity can be reimagined to foster greater 
inclusiveness and alter perceptions of immigrants within the country, if this is a preferred 
outcome or discourse to those that are currently taking place within the country. 
Additional research could investigate how other available components of Italianità could 
be emphasized to alter perceptions of Italian identity. Additional research in this area 
could also include considering the political obstacles that would need to be overcome to 
achieve this alternative identity discourse. 
Further research could involve a more extensive analysis of the language 
employed by national daily newspaper publications, such as Il Giornale and La 
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Repubblica. This extension would also include analyzing publications from La Padania, 
which was the official daily newspaper of the Lega Nord that was suspended in 
December of 2014 because of financial difficulties. I believe these supplementary 
extensions to my research would offer useful additions and more depth to this area of 
research. 
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Bertelsmann Stiftung (Gütersloh, Germany), and Migration Policy Institute. Rethinking 
National Identity in the Age of Migration: The Transatlantic Council on Migration. 
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